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1. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2005) (cataloging religious
elements in displays throughout federal buildings, including the Supreme Court courtroom
frieze of Moses holding the Ten Commandments).
2. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-88 (1992) (finding that prayer at a public-
school graduation ceremony imposed “subtle coercive pressures” on students); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (finding that prayer in public-school classrooms imposed “indirect
coercive pressure” on students). 
3. See Should We Care About Religious Symbols Cases?, posting of Thomas C. Berg to
Mirror of Justice, http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2005/06/page/2/ (June 29,
2005, 6:13 PM) (noting Neuborne’s comments in group discussion on SCOTUSblog regarding
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 545
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RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS AND THE VOLUNTARY
APPROACH TO CHURCH AND STATE
THOMAS C. BERG*
Introduction
My first, gut reaction to Establishment Clause cases about religious displays
is that they are unimportant and it is irritating to see so much effort, emotion,
and paper spent on them.  From the standpoint of serious religion, it is hard to
imagine that any display of the Ten Commandments does anything to make
this a more Christian or religious nation, more inclined to live according to
biblical values, or indeed that such a display affects anyone’s behavior.  It
seems an entirely symbolic statement, and people are far too ready to settle for
symbolic statements that distract them from the real work of trying to advance
moral values in government and society.
But there are also reasons to question putting so much effort into
challenging these displays.  The simple posting of a display in a public
building is among the least oppressive things a religious majority can do to
carry out its beliefs through government.  Expressions of the Jewish and
Christian traditions appear throughout public buildings, such as the U.S.
Supreme Court building itself,1 and they have not led to any restrictions on
those who disagree.  These contexts differ from public schools, for example,
where impressionable children may be pressured, subtly or otherwise, into
participating in or affirming religious activity.2  Wouldn’t it be more sensible,
one could ask, for the ACLU to lighten up and let these non-coercive displays
go?  Longtime ACLU litigator Burt Neuborne made just that suggestion in a
group blog discussion I participated in after the Supreme Court’s decisions on
Ten Commandments displays in 2005.3
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U.S. 677 (2005)). 
4. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, John Marshall: In Answer to a Motion That the Court Adjourn on February 4, 1901,
the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Day on Which Marshall Took His Seat as Chief Justice,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266, 270 (1921)).
5. 568 F.3d 784, 800-03 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
6. See Peter Irons, Curing a Monumental Error: The Presumptive Unconstitutionality of
Ten Commandments Displays, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2010).
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.
This is only my first reaction, however.  On further reflection, I usually
remember Justice Felix Frankfurter’s remark that “[w]e live by symbols.”4
Symbols sometimes distract people from real issues and challenges, but
sometimes they embody those issues and challenges.  In the latter cases, we
ignore symbols at our peril. 
I believe, however, that we need to ask just why First Amendment values
demand that we care about non-coercive displays of the Ten Commandments
and other religious content.  Professor Irons, like the panel in Green v. Haskell
County Board of Commissioners,5 goes into detail to show that a Ten
Commandments display has a religious purpose and that the Commandments
have not served as a significant source of American law.6  But focusing only
on those considerations as grounds for finding displays unconstitutional is
unsatisfying.  It begs the question why, in a nation with a tradition of such
generalized, non-coercive displays, courts should be invalidating them at all.
That requires more discussion of foundational principles in America’s tradition
of religious freedom.
I argue here that the distinctive constitutional approach to church-state
relations in America is the “voluntary” approach, under which government
leaves religious practice to the free decisions and energies of individuals and
groups.  Several principles within that approach call for invalidating official
displays that endorse the religious truth of propositions such as the Ten
Commandments.  But another key component of the American approach is that
religion remains important to public life.  Indeed, in America a primary
argument for religious freedom and other human rights has been a religious
argument that rights are God-given and therefore have priority over
government authority.  Thus, although religious voluntarism calls for
invalidating many government-sponsored religious displays, the rationale for
invalidating them must recognize the multiple ways in which religion is
relevant to public life at the most fundamental levels.  This paper suggests
three means of recognizing that relevance.7
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8. ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 287-88 (Edwin S.
Gaustad ed., Arno Press & The New York Times 1969) (1844).
9. For an extensive review of the elimination of establishments and religious taxes in
various states, see Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement
in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385.
10. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 49
(2d ed. 2006).
11.  Examples of leading Baptist writings include ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE
PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND
CALVINISM 303 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968) [hereinafter BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE];
JOHN LELAND, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER
JOHN LELAND 179 (L.F. Greene ed., Arno Press 1969) (1845).
I. Religious Symbols and the Paradox of Religious Voluntarism
A substantial body of historical and legal-historical writing concludes that
America’s distinctive approach to church-state relations developed during the
founding era and early Republic, and is best characterized as the “voluntary”
approach.  Writing in the 1840s, America’s first great religious historian,
Robert Baird, described the “voluntary principle” under which government
would neither suppress nor promote worship:
In every state liberty of conscience and liberty of worship is
complete.  The government extends protection to all. . . .  The
proper civil authorities have nothing to do with the creed of those
who open such a place of worship. . . .  On the other hand, . . .
neither the general government nor that of the States does any thing
directly for the maintenance of public worship. . . .  [Religion
relies] upon the efforts of its friends, acting from their own free
will.8
This approach was evident in the founding era in some states, such as
Virginia, but it did not gather a national consensus until the early Republic,
when New England states eliminated their tax-financed support of clergy and
houses of worship.9  The process of securing full rights of religious exercise
and ending tax support of clergy and worship was driven at least as much by
Protestant evangelicals like Baptists, with their leaders Isaac Backus and Elder
John Leland, as by Enlightenment-influenced statesmen like James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson.  The statesmen wrote enduring documents such as
Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.”10
But evangelicals wrote popular pamphlets and provided the largest share of the
votes for disestablishment.11
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12. TIMOTHY L. SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM IN MID-NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 35 (1957).
13. See, e.g., MARK NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 174-75 (2002); see also WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: THE BAPTISTS’
STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND, 1630-1833, at 246 (1991) (describing America’s approach of
voluntarism as “sui generis in Western civilization”).  See generally WINTHROP S. HUDSON,
THE GREAT TRADITION OF THE AMERICAN CHURCHES (1953); SIDNEY MEAD, THE LIVELY
EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA (1963).
14. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 9.
15. For a similar formulation, see id. at 1580-81.
16. For the argument that preserving the power of the states was the only meaning of the
original Establishment Clause, see, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE
QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-34 (1995); Joseph M.
Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371.
For arguments that the Establishment Clause reflected in part (or even largely) substantive
principles against establishment, see, e.g., Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment
Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761 (2005).
17. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1141 (1995) (describing how a substantive
principle of non-establishment achieved consensus and was taken as part of the meaning of the
By the 1830s, historian Timothy Smith writes, America with its voluntary
system had “created a new pattern of church-state relations, unknown since the
first century.”12  Many other historians concur that the voluntary approach is
America’s “singular” tradition concerning religion and the state.13  In the field
of constitutional history, Carl Esbeck has done as much as any scholar to
document the development of voluntarism and describe its premises and
principles.14
The voluntary approach tracks the First Amendment’s two religion
provisions: it combines basic freedom for all faiths (free exercise) with
government non-involvement in the distinctive sphere of religious life and in
churches (non-establishment).15  But the relationship between the voluntary
approach and the Constitution is complex.  Because voluntarism had not
gained a consensus by 1791, when the Bill of Rights was adopted, the First
Amendment reflected this approach only in part: the Establishment Clause
rested at least as much on federalism, a desire to bar the new federal
government from interfering with arrangements concerning religion in the
states.16  For this reason, one can draw only limited lessons from the First
Amendment’s specific history.  But matters were different by 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed and (let us assume for these purposes)
applied the restrictions of the Religion Clauses to the states as “privileges and
immunities” of U.S. citizens.  By that time, the voluntary approach had won
consensus throughout the states, and the First Amendment was taken to reflect
that approach.17
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First Amendment).
18. MADISON, supra note 10, para. 2. 
19. ISAAC BACKUS, A Declaration of the Rights, of the Inhabitants of the State of
Massachusetts-Bay, in New England, in BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, supra note 11, app. 3, at
487.
20. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Carroll, Aug. 15,
1789).
21. MADISON, supra note 10, para. 6.
22. LYMAN BEECHER, A PLEA FOR THE WEST 78 (Cincinnati, Truman & Smith 1835).
23. 1 LYMAN BEECHER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LYMAN BEECHER 253 (Barbara M. Cross
ed., 1961), as reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 318 (Edwin
S. Gaustad ed., 1982) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
The voluntary approach included several more specific principles.  First was
the proposition that government should not impose upon private citizens’
choice in matters of religion.  As Madison put it in the “Memorial and
Remonstrance” against Virginia’s tax support for clergy, the duty to worship
the Creator is “precedent, both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the
claims of Civil Society”; thus, “[t]he Religion . . . of every man must be left
to the conviction and conscience of every man.”18  This principle reflects the
importance and sensitivity of both the religious conscience for the person and
the proposition, repeatedly emphasized by Baptists like Backus, that
“[n]othing can be true religion but a [fully] voluntary obedience [to God’s]
revealed will.”19  The principle covered cases of coercion through legal
sanctions but also more subtle pressures on religious choice.  Congressman
Daniel Carroll, for example, remarked during the debates on the First
Amendment that “[t]he rights of conscience . . . will little bear the gentlest
touch of governmental hand.”20
A second principle was a separation of church and state that emphasized the
exclusion of the state from religious institutions and from core religious
activities so as to protect the autonomy of religious life and the vitality and
independence of religious groups.  For example, Madison argued that
“ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy
of Religion, have had a contrary operation.”21  Prominent clergyman Lyman
Beecher, at first a defender of Connecticut’s religious establishment, ultimately
concluded that “a union of church and state . . . [has] never existed without
corrupting the church . . . , by making the ministry . . . a sinecure aristocracy
of indolence and secular ambition.”22  Beecher famously came to describe
disestablishment as “the best thing that ever happened to the State of
Connecticut” because it “cut the churches loose from dependence on state
support[ and] threw them wholly on their own resources and on God.”23
American separationism was hospitable to religion, unlike the version that
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24. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK: HOW THE GLOBAL
REVIVAL OF FAITH IS CHANGING THE WORLD 32-35, 60-72 (2009) (contrasting the predominate
views toward religion espoused in the two revolutions);  NOLL, supra note 13, at 53-54 (noting
that Americans found republicanism and religion compatible while Europeans, especially the
French, found them incompatible).
25. JOHN LELAND, Fast-Day Sermon, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND,
supra note 11, at 240-42, 251-52, as reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 23, at
319, 320-21.
26. MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 261-62.
27. See MADISON, supra note 10, para. 4.
28. For catalogs of such practices in Supreme Court opinions, see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 633-36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100-06
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (discussing critics’ charge that “civil religion” practices
of 1950s promoted diluted, complacent religion).
30. For example, government-sponsored religion in the early public schools blatantly
disfavored Catholicism.  For just one summary of such discriminatory patterns, see John C.
grew out of the French Revolution, which was founded in suspicion of religion
and a desire to protect society from religious oppression.24
A third principle was that government should treat varying denominations
equally in order to reduce the resentment and division caused by favoritism.
Elder John Leland, a leader among Baptists in fighting for disestablishment,
summarized the argument when he stated that the pattern of “religious laws
and test oaths” favoring some “raises the uniformists to arrogance and
superiority, and sinks the non-conformists into disgrace and depression; and,
thereby, destroys that confidence and friendly equality, which is essential to
the happiness of any state.”25  By 1791 “[e]very one of the 12 state
constitutional provisions protecting religious liberty contained language
referring to denominational equality (though in two states this equality was
extended only to Christian denominations).”26  The equality principle also
helped bring about the end of tax-financed clergy support, which tended to
favor majority religious views.27
Looking only at these principles of voluntarism, one might be surprised to
find American governments in the nineteenth century sponsoring religious
exercises or symbols such as legislative prayers, Thanksgiving proclamations,
and prayers and Bible readings in public schools.28  Such practices constituted
government involvement in religious matters; they did not leave religion
purely to voluntary initiative.  They did carry, however, at least the risk of
teaching a diluted religion, attuned more to political values than to the values
of the various faiths the practices were supposed to represent.29  And the
prayers and symbols at least indirectly treated as less equal any religious view
other than the generalized theism they expressed—which was often a
generalized Christianity or even a generalized Protestantism.30
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Jeffries, Jr. & James A. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 279, 297-305 (2001).
31. President George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), as reprinted in
MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 41-42.
32. Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of
the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), reprinted in 9 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 229
(Charles F. Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1854).
33. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
34. On the importance of voluntary societies, see, e.g., NOLL, supra note 13, at 197-99
(discussing “social benevolence,” educational, evangelistic, and other societies); see also
HUDSON, supra note 13, at 71-74, 77-78 (discussing similar categories of voluntary societies).
But these government practices were pervasive in nineteenth-century
America, and some continue today.  They reflect a fourth principle in
America’s church-state tradition: even though religion was to be voluntary, it
was also deemed relevant to public matters and public morality.  To take just
a couple of the many examples, George Washington in his Farewell Address
said that
[o]f all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . .
And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can
be maintained without religion. . . .  [R]eason and experience both
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion
of religious principle.31
John Adams added that “[o]ur Constitution was made only for a moral and
religious people.  It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”32
In eliminating religious establishments, Americans did not reject the
proposition that religion, authentically followed by individuals, was crucial to
public matters and civil society.  They only rejected the proposition that
religious establishments would contribute to authentic religion.
Just what this importance of voluntary religion entailed, however, was
disputed.  Everyone agreed it would mean that religious values would affect
society indirectly through the actions of individuals and voluntary
associations: Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in the 1830s that religion exercised
great influence on American political society because “it directs mores, and it
is in regulating the family that it works to regulate the state.”33  Moral behavior
by individuals would benefit society, as would the efforts of voluntary Bible
societies to teach biblical literacy, independent religious colleges to educate
young people, or voluntary charities to assist orphans and others in need.34  But
it was also widely recognized that individuals would bring their religious
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35. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1124-28, 1130-31
(1994) (discussing the rise of “religious social activism” in the early Republic).
36. See Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1435–37.
37. Id. at 1400 n.39.
38. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 13, at 259.
39. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (finding
unconstitutional a courthouse display featuring the Ten Commandments); County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a crèche
displayed alone in county courthouse); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating a
statutory requirement for public-school classroom displays of the Ten Commandments); Sch.
Dist. of Abingtin Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)  (invalidating a statutory requirement
for public-school classroom Bible readings); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking
down school-board mandated classroom prayers in a public school).
values into political debate and legislation, as was the case, for example, in the
movements to abolish polygamy, slavery, and alcohol.35
In addition, however, many proponents of the voluntary tradition said that
government could also endorse Christian norms through explicit ceremonies,
statements, or symbols.  For example, although Baptist Isaac Backus fought
tooth and nail against Massachusetts’s compulsory support of clergy, he
endorsed a whole range of state measures to support Christianity.36  Supporters
often rationalized such practices, as Carl Esbeck has noted, by saying that they
were purely ceremonial and not coercive (even though that was not always
true).37  Other great proponents of religious liberty like Madison, Jefferson,
and John Leland argued against virtually every form of state support for
religion.  But the host of government practices endorsing religion on into the
twentieth century shows, as the great religious historian William McLoughlin
remarked, that Americans “preferred the pietistic vision of Backus to the
secularistic one of Jefferson.”38
I believe that many of these practices were inconsistent with the underlying
principles of the voluntary approach to religion and that the Supreme Court
has been correct to invalidate them in recent times—and correct to refuse to
uphold them merely because they traditionally have enjoyed wide
acceptance.39
But in some cases, invalidating a religious statement by government may
pose a serious conflict with the voluntary tradition.  It may undermine the
government’s ability to explain one of the most important rationales for
religious freedom itself, namely, a religious rationale.  Professor Steven Smith,
for example, has argued that the “principal” justification for religious freedom
in America has been the religious argument mentioned above—that duties to
God must be left to voluntary conscience, without government pressure,
because they come prior to duties to society and because faith coerced by
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss1/2
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40. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154-56 (1991); MADISON, supra note 10, para. 2; see also
supra text accompanying note 18.
41. MADISON, supra note 10, para. 1.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (2010).
43. See Smith, supra note 40, at 223.
44. Id. at 150, 188.
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
46.  For a fuller explication and analysis of this argument, see Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge
of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 52-58 (2003).
government cannot be real or effective.40  Madison led off the “Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” with such an argument: “It is
the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage . . . as he believes
to be acceptable to him,” a duty that is prior to the claims of government.41
Thomas Jefferson’s preamble to Virginia’s 1786 Religious Freedom Statute
similarly invokes theological rationales, asserting that “Almighty God hath
created the mind free; [and] that all attempts to influence it by temporal
punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations[] . . . are a departure from
the plan of the Holy Author of our religion.”42  The religious justification not
only was central historically, Smith argues, but also constitutes the most
convincing normative reason for giving special solicitude to religious freedom:
secular rationales cannot explain why religion is distinctive from other human
activities.43
But the religious justification for religious freedom is undermined by a
broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause that prohibits government
from endorsing or expressing any religious propositions.  A government that
cannot endorse any religious statement cannot explicitly endorse the religious
justification for religious freedom.  As Smith puts it, the constitutional
commitment to religious freedom becomes “self-canceling”; it is “disabled
from acknowledging the principal historical justification for its existence.”44
As a result, the commitment to religious freedom may be weakened because
the government cannot effectively explain why religion calls for special
treatment as compared with other human activities.
Religious freedom is not the only human right that, in the American
tradition, rests in part on a religious rationale.  The Declaration of
Independence claims that rights to life, liberty, and property are inalienable
because they are conferred on humans by “their Creator.”45  The implicit
argument, made explicit in other sources, is that rights are more secure in a
society that believes they stem from a source higher than any human
authority.46  Thus, as Michael Perry has said, no secular argument in America
for human rights “will begin to have the power of an argument that appeals at
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47. Michael J. Perry, Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1023, 1073 (1993).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340.
49. Id.
50. See Berg, supra note 46, at 59-69; Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exercise and
Nonestablishment Norms Forbid?  Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom,
1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 549, 569-75 (2003); see also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27.
least in part to the conviction that all human beings are sacred and ‘created
equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights.’”47
One familiar religious statement by government arguably expresses the
religious rationale for religious freedom, among other human rights.  When
Congress added “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954, the House
report justified the legislation as an affirmation that government was a limited
institution and that rights came from a higher source.  The report stated that
“[o]ur American Government is founded on the concept of the individuality
and dignity of the human being.  Underlying this concept is the belief that the
human person is important because he was created by God and endowed by
Him with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may usurp.”48  In
contrast, the report said, “the atheistic and materialistic conceptions of
communism” lead to the “subservience of the individual” to the state.49  Given
the prominence of this idea in both early and recent American history, it would
be problematic if the Establishment Clause forbade government to express it
in a non-coercive manner.50
The American voluntarist tradition, then, contains a paradox.  The tradition
says that government should not define an orthodox or preferred religious
position.  But a significant justification for that principle is itself a religious
justification, which entails government taking a position on a religious matter.
How to resolve this paradox, if at all—to find a principle that gives room to
both of these affirmations—is a challenge for Establishment Clause doctrine.
II. Religious Symbols, Voluntarism, and the Relevance of Religion to Public
Life
A. Official Symbols and Voluntarism
If the first three principles of the voluntary approach are applied
vigorously,51 it should be unconstitutional for the state to sponsor a display that
endorses the religious truth of the Ten Commandments, either by displaying
it alone or by making statements endorsing its religious truth even while
including it in a broader display.
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52. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
53. See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 app. B, at 811 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
54. Id. at 792.
55. See Panel Discussion, Signs of the Times: The First Amendment and Religious
Symbolism, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 67, 69 (2010).  
56. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the City’s contention that
it sought “to attract people to the downtown area in order to promote pre-Christmas retail
sales”).
57. 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962).
1. Government Influence on Religious Choice
A display endorsing the Commandments’ religious truth injects government
influence into religious life and the debate over religious ideas.  Although it
does not coerce religious dissenters, it can inflict more subtle harms on them.
As Justice O’Connor noted, explicit endorsement of particular religious views
“sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community.”52  Such harms are relevant because of the special
sensitivity of matters of religious conscience.
2. Corruption of Religion
What is more, official displays can pose the threat to religion that the
American tradition of separation seeks to avoid: the loss of independence and
integrity from too close an association with government.  Official religious
statements are likely to water down the faith, or to coopt it as support for
nationalism, consumerism, or other political interests.  Such dynamics
happened in the Haskell County dispute: the Ten Commandments display was
flanked by American flags,53 and a poster to raise funds for the display
“depicted a young girl praying before an American flag with the caption ‘One
Nation Under God.’”54  In his remarks at this symposium, Carl Esbeck aptly
noted the irony in the girl’s praying before the flag to raise money for a
monument that proscribes worshiping idols.55 Or consider Lynch v. Donnelly,
where the downtown merchants’ association, in cooperation with the City of
Pawtucket, erected a Christ-child crèche display to encourage the right kind
of attitude in holiday consumers.56
Concerns about the dilution of religion were present when the Court in the
early 1960s began to strike down public-school prayers and other official
religious exercises.  The first of these decisions, Engel v. Vitale, emphasized
among other things the proposition that “religion is too personal, too sacred,
too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”57  It is
no coincidence, I believe, that at that time more and more prominent voices
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were declaring frustration with the civil religion of the 1950s that had
manifested itself in widespread but relatively generalized official religious
practices.
The critics in the 1960s raised two objections to the practices of civil
religion, echoing the objections to established churches in the early Republic.
One was that the practices by nature watered down religion to make it
“negotiable to the widest possible public,” and thereby deprived it of energy.58
One writer lamented the “opening prayers, Bible breakfasts,” and other
“general, inoffensive, and externalized [practices] . . . put together for public
purposes,”59 which tended to represent not “a faith integral to the participants’
lives, but rather the prudent recollection by a functionary of what the public
would expect.”60  Another objected that the effort “to reassert religious values
by posting the Ten Commandments on every school-house wall, by erecting
cardboard nativity shrines on every corner, by writing God’s name on our
money,” and so forth simply “cheapened and degraded” the “sacred symbols,”
often producing the same effect as “a television commercial on a captive
audience—boredom and resentment.”61
The other criticism was that civil religion produced self-satisfaction and
complacency—what Madison might have called “pride and
indolence”62—encouraging the illusion that America was a “Christian nation”
simply because it displayed symbols, not because it maintained justice.  Robert
Alley, a leading opponent of school prayers from the 1960s to the present,
testified to Congress in 1966 that official prayers were “more akin to a national
cult . . . than to the faith of the New Testament.”63  Reflecting later, he added
that “the Sermon on the Mount was generally ignored by white citizens in the
wake of [Brown v. Board of Education]. . . .  Nothing in our recent past so
clearly identifies the shallowness of the public religious sentiments of the era
than does the fundamentally unjust treatment of black citizens.”64  The
Episcopal bishop of Chicago praised the Engel decision precisely because it
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“dissipates the myth that ours is a Christian country. . . . [and] should clear the
air and put the challenge squarely up to the churches and Christian parents.”65
A theologian whose books were popular in mainline Protestant churches
celebrated the “removal of the scaffolding of Christendom and establishment
and the deliverance of the Christian fellowship into an open world” to seek
justice and freedom for all people through efforts such as the civil rights
movement.66
3. Inequality Among Competing Religious Ideas
Finally, to single out the Commandments for endorsement also treats
religious faiths unequally by endorsing propositions that are particular to the
Jewish and Christian traditions, such as the prohibition on graven images and
the injunction to keep the Sabbath holy.67  The framers of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments were mostly concerned with equality among
Christian denominations; those were the religious controversies familiar to
them.  But the principle of equality among competing religious ideas, applied
in today’s more pluralistic conditions, should extend further.  The Court’s
recent decisions striking down official religious pronouncements extend
equality for dissenters beyond minority or dissenting Christian denominations
to non-Christians and those with no religious faith at all.68  This extension
reflects the fact that as religious pluralism has increased, more and more
official religious statements have come to be partial and to exclude a
significant number of views on religious questions.
B. The Relevance of Religion to Public Life
But what about the final important principle in the American tradition, the
relevance of religion to public life and public matters?  Does it require that
non-coercive displays of the Commandments be upheld?  My answer is no.
In the remainder of this section, I consider three ways to recognize the
relevance of religion to public life while still invalidating official displays that
endorse the religious truth of the Ten Commandments.
1. The Religious Rationale for Rights
First, even if the government has power to recognize a religious rationale
for religious freedom and human rights—through a statement like “under God”
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in the Pledge, for example69—this does not provide a justification for Ten
Commandments displays.  The government’s ability to articulate the religious
rationale for rights must be subject to limits or else it could seriously
undermine religious voluntarism itself.  Government’s power to acknowledge
a higher power that grounds human dignity and rights does not, for example,
give government the power to make statements about the proper way of
worshiping that God.  If voluntarism is to be preserved, a permissible
government statement must directly tie a religious justification to a political
proposition, and it must be general in its religious content.
The Ten Commandments do not satisfy either of these criteria.  True, the
Commandments’ second table contains moral commands without explicit
theological assertions, and the phrase “Thou shalt have no other gods before
me” could be taken as a simple statement of the priority of God over all human
authorities, including governments.  But other Commandments in the first
table—the prohibitions against graven images, Sabbath work, or taking the
Lord’s name in vain—bear no relation to political morality; they concern only
religious matters of ritual, worship, or relationship with God.  They also reflect
particular or disputed positions on such matters: not all faiths recognize a
sabbath or understand the role of images of a deity in the same way.70
“Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance is different on both scores.  The
phrase is embedded in a statement about the nation’s political aspiration to
“liberty and justice,” and under one major interpretation—that asserted in the
1954 congressional report71—the phrase aimed to express precisely the limited
nature of government and the inalienability of rights founded in a higher
authority.72  “Under God” is also short and general enough that it arguably
avoids taking positions on any disputed religious question other than the
proposition that a divine authority exists above human government.
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There are still problems with “under God” in the Pledge, since in most
contexts it does not simply assert the religious rationale but asks individuals
to affirm it as part and parcel of their affirmation of loyalty to the nation.
When the individuals are children in a school classroom the phrase is coercive,
and even when they are not the phrase leaves the suggestion that atheists,
because they cannot affirm this loyalty oath fully, are “‘outsiders, not full
members of the political community.’”73  But I also think that simply
excluding “under God” from the Pledge is unsatisfactory.  That does not just
exclude an important rationale for religious freedom.  It may also imply, or be
taken to imply, that the state cannot acknowledge any no possible higher limits
on its authority–an implication that many other citizens will find unacceptable
as part of a loyalty oath.74
If simply barring “under God” from the Pledge is unsatisfactory too, how
can the problem be resolved?  One sensible solution is that offered by
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager: a school or other government
entity administering the Pledge may include “under God” if it also offers the
option to say a secular alternative, such as “one Nation, of equals, indivisible.
. . .”75  I have proposed a different solution, a pause in the Pledge into which
students could insert “under God” or some other phrase chosen by themselves
or their parents.76  But whatever solution is best for the Pledge of Allegiance
problem, the permissibility of including “under God” does not entail the
permissibility of official displays endorsing the Ten Commandments.
2. Acknowledging Religion in an Overall Display
For the reasons above, the tradition of voluntarism, best understood, does
call for invalidating government displays that endorse the religious truth of the
Ten Commandments.  Nor can the government endorse the truth of the
Commandments even when they are included as part of a broader display with
other documents or components.  The panel in Green v. Haskell County Board
of Commissioners was correct in this holding,77 and the Supreme Court in
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky was correct to determine that the final
of the three displays, which included the Commandments among historic legal
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documents, was unconstitutionally tainted by the first two displays’ clear
favoritism for religion.78  Unlike Professor Irons, however, I would not adopt
the presumption that all displays of the Commandments are unconstitutional.79
The government ought to be able to include religious content as a relevant
component in an overall display serving a secular goal or making a historical
or other secular statement.  Thus, I see no inherent bar to including the Ten
Commandments in a display of sources of law generally, or even just
American law.
The reason for upholding such displays is, again, that America’s voluntary
approach recognizes the relevance of religion to public life and does not
support artificial secularization of public life.80  It is simply empirical fact that
religion has played an important role in many topics on which government
speaks,81 and to forbid government to acknowledge that role would skew
understanding in a secularist direction.  The same is true with displays about
sources of law.  It is true, as Professor Irons notes, that many historians have
contested the direct historical relevance of the Ten Commandments to
American law.82  I do not quarrel with their conclusions, but I would not
subject the historical role of the Commandments to microanalysis when they
are displayed not alone but among a large collection of documents.
The historians’ objection has been to treating the Commandments as a
“seminal” or uniquely important document in the development of American
law.83  Even Steven Green, one of the leading historical critics, writes that
[f]ew people, if any, would dispute that the Ten Commandments—
and its parallels from other ancient cultures—as well as other
directives contained in the Pentateuch of the Hebrew and Christian
Scriptures, inform our notions of right and wrong and, as such,
have influenced the development of Western law of which the
American legal system is part.84
Including the Commandments in a broader display can reflect, however
imperfectly, the strong influence of the Christian and Jewish traditions on
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American notions of public morality and of law.  And while including a
passage from the Koran along with the Commandments—as Mohammed is
included with Moses among great lawgivers on the frieze of the Supreme
Court courtroom85—would broaden a display’s inclusiveness, I think that it is
permissible for the display to reflect the proposition that Christianity and its
Jewish roots have played a greater historical role in American law and public
morality than have other faiths.
The Court’s precedents on holiday displays plainly allow government to
acknowledge religion’s role in history and culture.  Lynch v. Donnelly and
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter permitted,
respectively, a crèche in an overall Christmas display with secular symbols86
and a menorah with a Christmas tree in an overall display conveying a
“message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season.”87  In
both decisions, Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, which Professor Irons
commends in his paper,88 led to permitting the religious content in the display.
The endorsement test served as the basis for O’Connor’s crucial concurring
opinion in Lynch upholding the crèche,89 and for a majority opinion, however
fractured, in Allegheny upholding the menorah and Christmas tree.90  Indeed,
the crèche and menorah were approved even though they are core religious
symbols, tied to worship and ritual rather than to civil government’s core
concerns of moral and political values.  In both cases, O’Connor concluded
that although the overall setting did not neutralize “the religious and indeed
sectarian significance” of the crèche or menorah, it did “change[] what viewers
may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display—as a typical museum
setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting,
negates any message of endorsement of that content.”91
Permitting a religious display on the ground that it communicates a secular
message creates a real danger of eviscerating the display’s religious
meaning—and producing just the kind of watered-down faith that makes
establishments objectionable from the perspective of the voluntary approach
to church and state.  As I’ve already suggested, decisions like Lynch probably
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compromise religious meaning by finding that religious symbols such as the
crèche simply communicate a message of holiday cheer.92  What most
threatens religious integrity is when courts strain to find a secular message in
order to uphold a display.  In Green, the panel avoided this danger; it
concluded that the display endorsed the Ten Commandments’ religious truth
because, even though it was accompanied by other monuments, there was no
“unified exhibit” with a “unifying, cohesive secular theme.”93  In my view,
such a standard strikes the proper balance.  Under it, government may
acknowledge the historical role of religion, in a museum, a legitimately
educational exhibit, or other contexts.  But the government must show that the
context has such secular integrity or cohesion.  Under this standard, the
government may not display the Commandments in a way that emphasizes
their religious and moral value and then turn around and deny that religious
content in order to uphold the display.  That is what strips an expression of its
religious content and implicates the voluntarist concern that the government
is diluting the faith by supporting it.
3. Religion’s Public Relevance in Other Contexts
Finally, there are other church-state issues where the government can affirm
both the principles of voluntarism and the principle that religion is relevant to
public life.  The rationale for invalidating official religious displays is crucial
because it will affect these other issues.  It is not problematic to invalidate
religious displays on the basis that they conflict with the fundamental
principles of voluntarism in religion: special respect for choice in religious
matters, the autonomy of religious life and ideas from interference or cooption
by government, and equality among religions in an increasingly pluralistic
society.94  These arguments are consistent with the American tradition of
voluntarism.  But it is problematic if displays are invalidated on the basis that
the public sphere must be secular and religion must be kept separate from it.
That rationale conflicts with the premise that religion remains relevant to
public life.95  Religious autonomy is the right rationale; secularism the wrong
one. 
Religious autonomy and secularism produce the same results in cases about
official displays (at least in many of them).  But they produce differing results
on other important religious-freedom issues.  So I want to turn attention to
those issues for a moment.  At the end of his paper, Professor Irons asks some
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good questions of Kevin Theriot, the advocate for the Haskell County Ten
Commandments display.96  But in light of what I’ve said, I would like to ask
a couple of questions of Professor Irons as well.
First, although the government should not adopt and favor religious
ceremonies or symbols, shouldn’t religious arguments be able to play a
significant role in political debate and legislation about matters within
government’s jurisdiction?  The voluntary tradition certainly says so.  The very
same antebellum religious revivals that replaced old-line established churches
with growing, voluntaristic sects also gave birth to the abolitionist movement
that campaigned to change laws and eliminate slavery.97  Religious groups and
arguments have played central roles in political reform movements ever since.
Some proponents of a more absolutist church-state separation take that
principle to mean that religious arguments may play little or no role in the
passage of legislation.98  But isn’t this religious involvement instead a natural
part of our political system?
Second, if the courts should protect dissenters from the special harms
caused by government endorsement of religion, shouldn’t they also protect
dissenters from the special harms caused by government burdens on their
religion?  The Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that the
Free Exercise Clause permits government to prohibit religious exercise as long
as it does so by applying a “neutral law of general applicability.”99  In my
view, this rule fails to recognize the special sensitivity and importance of
religious choice in individuals’ lives—which is one of the main premises for
striking down government sponsorship of religious symbols like the Ten
Commandments.
Moreover, recognizing the importance of religious matters to people entails
protecting religiously motivated conduct, not only when it is private and
cordoned off from others, but also when it is “public”—not in the sense that
it is done by government, but rather in the sense that it occurs in and affects
the broader civil society.  One important implication is that religious social-
service organizations should presumptively be able to follow their tenets and
maintain their identities while providing assistance to others.  Take, for
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example, the recent dispute in Massachusetts where Catholic Charities ceased
providing adoption services because the state was mandating that it place
children with same-sex couples on the same terms as opposite-sex married
couples.100  If we intend seriously to protect the free exercise of
religion—which means extending protection to religious conduct that occurs
in civil society—then Catholic Charities should have a presumptive right to
follow its tenets.  This right would cease to exist only upon a showing that
imposing on Catholic Charities was necessary in order to ensure the
availability of adoption services to same-sex couples.101
Protecting religious exercise in such settings reflects the American
voluntary tradition.  Religion remains highly relevant to social life, but its
effect comes through voluntary organizations whose autonomy the government
respects.
Conclusion
Symbols matter.  The grounds on which courts explain their treatment of
Ten Commandments displays can symbolize their approach to Religion Clause
disputes in general.  Official religious displays should not be invalidated on the
basis that religion is a private matter and the public sphere must be secular.
Displays can be invalidated in many cases on the basis of the voluntarist
approach.  Although religion may be highly relevant to public life, its
influence should normally operate through independent, private religious
institutions and through individuals who bring their values to bear on political
questions—not through explicit government assertion of religious truths.
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